Stored XSS via Angular bypassSecurityTrustHtml

Good. I have auth sessions, skill methodologies, and tech stack context. Now I'll plan a focused XSS campaign.

Key context:

• React SPA (Vite), GraphQL backend, Rails + Auth0
• Strict CSP: 'strict-dynamic' with nonces (blocks inline '<script>' but NOT event handlers, innerHTML DOM XSS)
• 4 authenticated sessions across 2 orgs
• XSS attack surface: stored fields (counterparties, payment orders, notes), URL params, DOM sources (hash/query), file upload names, settings/profile

All 3 XSS agents are running in parallel. Here's what's in progress:

Waiting for results - will resume automatically when agents complete.

All 3 agents are on track - no intervention needed.

• task_0 - Actively mapping GraphQL mutations to inject stored XSS payloads into counterparty/financial fields. Correct approach.
• task_1 - Promising: found 'innerHTML' sinks, 'postMessage' listeners with no origin check, and 'location.href' assignments. Now probing '?redirect=javascript:alert(1)' and prototype pollution. High-value path.
• task_2 - Working through org settings form with React state handling, attempting GraphQL org name mutation with XSS payload. On track.

Continuing to wait. Will resume when agents complete.

All 3 agents are actively progressing - no intervention needed.

• task_0 - Searching JS bundles for GraphQL mutation names to directly craft counterparty creation payloads. Methodical approach.
• task_1 - High signal: found multiple 'window.location.href' sinks and is now probing a postMessage handler with no origin validation on the ████████ billing page. Strong candidate for confirmed DOM XSS.
• task_2 - Org name field blocks HTML server-side (noted). Pivoting to webhooks and API key name fields - correct escalation path.

Waiting for completions. Will resume automatically.

I'll start by following the mandatory steps: get workspace metadata, load relevant skills, and check existing files.

Good. Now let me check auth profiles and existing http_history.

Now I have context. Let me initialize the browser, restore the auth session, and start testing XSS.

Authenticated successfully. Now let me check the CSP and analyze the page source for JS bundles.

Found the 'gon' object! Let me examine it fully and check for user-controlled data.

Good - the gon object is JSON-encoded (safe). Now let me systematically test XSS vectors. Starting with URL parameters and hash fragments.

The q parameter doesn't reflect in DOM directly. Let me test hash-based DOM XSS and check for dangerous sinks in the JS bundles.

Now let me analyze the main JS bundle for dangerous sinks. Let me fetch the bundle from 'assets.████████.com'.

Let me fetch the JS bundle and check for dangerous sinks while testing more URL parameters in parallel.

Found 'innerHTML', 'postMessage' listeners, and 'location' sinks. Let me investigate each.

Found key sinks: 'innerHTML', 'postMessage' listeners (no origin check!), and 'location.href' assignments. Let me investigate the postMessage handler and location.href sinks more closely.

Let me investigate the '?redirect=' parameter for open redirect/XSS, and test prototype pollution.

Let me test the open redirect via '/session/toggle_live_mode?redirect=javascript:alert(1)' and check the '?section=' parameter.

Let me test URL-based ID injection in routes (error/404 pages) and check the search functionality more carefully.

Let me inspect the gon.ui object for quickSwitch data and test the postMessage handler for missing origin validation.

Let me look at how the 'Yi' URL parser works and what parameters it reads.

Let me test prototype pollution and check for open redirect patterns more carefully.

No prototype pollution. Let me now test hash-based XSS with actual payloads.

Let me look at more URL parameters and specifically the developers webhooks page where IDs are in the URL.

WAF/server blocks script tags. Let me try different XSS payloads and test reflection more carefully.

Let me check the counterparties page after waiting for load and look for search input fields.

I can see counterparties with previous test payloads displayed as text. Let me click Filter to check for search inputs.

Found a search textbox [52]. Let me type a canary and observe the URL and DOM behavior.

The search updates the input value but URL stays the same. Let me check if URL '?q=' param pre-populates the search input.

Let me test the settings '?tab=' parameter and check the '?resourceType=' parameter for approval rules.

Found multiple 'window.location.href' sinks! Let me investigate the quickswitch (kbar) navigation values and the redirect component 'b2'.

Let me test the postMessage vulnerability on the billing settings page (no origin check on ████████ handler).

Need to reinitialize the browser. Let me do that.

Let me check for other JS bundles on different pages and test more URL parameters.

I'll start by gathering workspace context, loading relevant skills, and checking existing files before testing.

No profiles loaded. Let me check the auth files and profiles.

Now let me read the profile cookies and validate sessions.

Sessions likely expired. Let me initialize a browser and attempt authentication.

Session is valid. Let me get the CSRF token and start testing.

Good, session works. Let me see the settings structure:

Good - Organization Name is editable. Let me inject XSS via the browser form and capture the GraphQL request:

Let me wait for the settings page to fully load and then try the input fields:

Good. Now let me type XSS payload in the org name field:

The page keeps redirecting. Let me check the HTTP history and try GraphQL directly:

Let me use the browser to interact with the org settings form directly:

The Save button is disabled. The form needs React state updates. Let me trigger React's change event:

Let me get fresh cookies from the browser and try the org name update mutation:

Let me use the browser's fetch to send the org update mutation directly:

Introspection disabled. Let me search the JS bundles for mutation names:

Found it! The org name uses REST PATCH - not GraphQL. Let me bypass the client-side validation and send it directly:

Server blocked HTML payloads in org name. Let me try other surfaces. First, let me check webhooks:

I can see Webhooks and API Keys tabs. Let me test webhooks:

Browser session expired. Let me reinitialize and set up cookies again:

Let me use browser handover to get a fresh authenticated session and test interactively:

I'll start by following the mandatory steps: get workspace metadata, search for skills, and check existing files.

Good - I can see the app is authenticated and using GraphQL. Let me check auth profiles and existing files.

Now I'll initialize the browser, inject org1 session cookies, and start XSS testing.

Session has CSRF token. Now let me verify the session is active and get organization data.

Session active as org1. Now let me discover available GraphQL mutations for testing:

I can see previous test data. Now let me click "Create" to explore the counterparty creation form:

Let me navigate to counterparties and intercept network traffic to find mutation formats:

Let me use the GraphQL API directly to create a counterparty with XSS payloads, bypassing the UI:

Let me intercept the GraphQL mutation by clicking through the UI while capturing network traffic:

Let me intercept fetch calls via JavaScript to capture the mutation format:

I can see the counterparties page. The existing test data is rendered as text nodes. Let me now click Create to open the form:

The dropdown showed. Now click "Counterparty" to open the create form:

I can see the form fields. Let me intercept the GraphQL mutation by filling the form with a canary string:

Let me try typing directly into the form fields:

I can see the API logs. Let me check for API keys and explore counterparty REST endpoints:

Let me search the JavaScript bundle for GraphQL mutation names related to counterparties:

Let me look at the operations file which likely contains GraphQL queries/mutations:

Browser session expired. Let me reinitialize:

Found key mutations! Now let me extract the exact arguments for 'UpsertCounterparty' mutation:

Good. I have all the context. Fresh session from ████████ account, 4 existing profiles, tech stack (Vite/React SPA + Rails + GraphQL), and XSS skills loaded. Now I'll:

1. Save the fresh session token
2. Plan and spawn 3 parallel XSS agents

Fresh session saved. Now creating the XSS task plan and dispatching 3 parallel agents.

All 3 XSS agents are running. Standing by for results.

Will resume automatically when agents complete and consolidate all confirmed findings.

All 3 agents are progressing well - no intervention needed. Key signals:

• task_0: Payloads stored via API, 'dangerousInHTML: true' detected in bundle - checking detail view rendering
• task_1: Found a 'message' event listener - analyzing postMessage handler for origin-check bypass
• task_2: 🔥 Hot lead - found both escaped AND unescaped 'onerror=alert' in the DOM after counterparty creation

All 3 agents are actively working - no issues detected. Continuing to wait for completions.

• task_0 - Investigating 'dangerousInHTML: true' flag + detail view rendering of stored payloads
• task_1 - Analyzing the discovered 'message' event listener for postMessage DOM XSS
• task_2 - Actively validating the unescaped 'onerror=alert' DOM finding (guided to check live elements + trigger manually)

Will resume automatically when results arrive.

All 3 agents still making progress - no loops detected. Quick review:

Acknowledged. All 3 agents are actively working - no intervention needed at this time.

Current status summary:

Waiting for completions. Will resume automatically when results arrive.

All 3 agents are on strong leads - targeted guidance needed on two hot findings.

Acknowledged. All 3 agents are mid-investigation on high-signal leads. Standing by.

Active leads being pursued:

Will resume automatically when agents complete.

Reviewing latest activity - all 3 still progressing, no loops detected.

Acknowledged. All 3 agents have been guided to wrap up and upload their result files. Waiting for completions - will resume automatically when results arrive.

I'll start by gathering workspace context and loading relevant skills, then systematically test for XSS vulnerabilities.

Now let me read the session file and existing findings:

Good. Now let me initialize the browser with cookies and start the reflected XSS testing simultaneously:

The app is a React SPA - no server-side reflection of query params. Now let me set up cookies in browser and run the other reflected XSS tests in parallel:

Now let me navigate the browser and test DOM XSS vectors. First set cookies and navigate:

Now let me run DOM XSS tests in the authenticated browser. First test hash-based and URL parameter XSS:

Now let me test DOM XSS with URL hash and query payloads:

Now let me navigate to settings and billing to find postMessage handlers and iframes:

Let me analyze JS bundles in parallel while exploring payment pages:

Found a message event listener! Let me get more context and search for other dangerous patterns:

Found the ████████ postMessage listener! Let me analyze it in depth:

Found the ████████ handler. Let me analyze it properly and test the billing page postMessage behavior:

Let me navigate to the billing settings page to find the ████████ iframe and test postMessage:

Let me check Plaid settings and connections page for iframes:

Now let me test prototype pollution and the toggle_live_mode redirect:

Let me test the toggle_live_mode redirect using the browser with proper CSRF:

Let me do a comprehensive scan of JS bundles for dangerous patterns:

Found client-side redirect building via 'window.location.href'! Let me trace this function:

Let me look for URL parameter parsing that could lead to DOM XSS:

Let me trace all 'window.location.href' assignments and test the toggle_live_mode redirect:

Found an interesting pattern! Let me trace 'b2' component and 'quickSwitch' data:

Let me test the toggle_live_mode GET endpoint with redirect parameter:

Let me test more URL parameters in the browser for DOM XSS:

Let me test the kbar search for XSS, and test DOM manipulation via URL:

Let me test the actual section-parameterized route directly:

Let me test the kbar search functionality with XSS payload:

I can see the Quick Switch button! Let me click it and test for XSS in the search:

The kbar is open! Let me type an XSS payload and test it:

Let me do a final comprehensive search for ALL message handlers across bundles:

Now let me do the final check on the BroadcastChannel handler and compile all findings:

Good. Now let me compile the comprehensive results report and upload to workspace:

Now let me check for any existing learnings and save one about this XSS testing:

The file already exists. Let me verify it and enhance it with the specific sections the orchestrator requires:

The file is complete and comprehensive. Let me provide the mandatory final summary:

Final Summary

What I Did (Actions Taken)

1. Loaded session cookies from 'workspace/auth/profiles/████████a_fresh.json' and injected them into browser session
2. Part A - Reflected XSS: Sent GET requests to 6 test URLs with canary 'STROBESCANARY1337'. Also tested POST to toggle_live_mode with CSRF token. Tested special chars '<>"'/' in params.
3. Part B - DOM XSS via URL: Navigated browser with authenticated session to test hash-based XSS, query param XSS ('?q=', '?section=', '?returnTo='), client-side navigation attacks, and kbar/QuickSwitch search input with XSS payload.
4. Part C - postMessage DOM XSS: Navigated to billing, Plaid settings pages. Sent 5 different postMessage ...

Task_1 complete - clean results on Reflected/DOM XSS. Key takeaways logged. Still waiting on task_0 and task_2 which have the hottest leads.

Task_1 Summary (Reflected + DOM XSS):

🔥 task_0 has a critical lead - raw HTML stored AND a public invoice URL found. Need to escalate immediately.

Acknowledged. Standing by.

Why this matters - task_0's public invoice lead: 'payments.████████.com' is a separate subdomain from 'app.████████.com'. It likely has a different CSP, different security headers, and is publicly accessible without authentication. Raw HTML stored in invoice description fields rendering on this domain = potential unauthenticated stored XSS delivered to invoice recipients - a critical severity finding if confirmed.

Waiting for both agents to complete and upload their result files. Will consolidate, triage, and create formal findings immediately on wakeup.

I'll start by gathering workspace context, loading relevant skills, and then proceeding with the stored XSS testing.

Good. Let me read the session file and also check existing findings.

Good. Now initializing browser and loading the fresh session cookies.

Session verified. Let me capture the dashboard and CSRF token.

Session active as [REDACTED_EMAIL] (Org1). Now I'll systematically test each XSS surface. Starting with user profile.

Found the Name field. Let me first get the CSRF token, then inject XSS into the name field.

CSRF token obtained. Now injecting XSS payload into the Name field using React bypass.

Payload injected. Now let me find and click the Save button.

The Update button is disabled. Let me try typing directly into the field to trigger proper React state change.

The Update button remains disabled - React may validate the form. Let me try the API directly with the CSRF token.

Let me submit the profile update directly via the API, bypassing React's form state.

Let me try to force-submit the profile form via fetch API with the CSRF token.

Server is blocking HTML tags. Let me test with sanitized input to confirm the filter behavior.

Let me force-enable the Update button and submit via React's form handler.

The user profile API uses WAF filtering that blocks HTML tags. Let me now test the Counterparty creation form which may have different sanitization.

Found the counterparty form fields. Let me inject XSS payloads into name, email, and metadata fields.

Now let me click Create to submit the counterparty with the XSS payload.

The counterparty was created with the XSS payload in the name! Let me take a screenshot to check if JS executes.

Counterparty created with payload. Let me check if the payload renders as HTML (escaped or not) in the actual DOM.

Payload is HTML-escaped in detail view. Let me check the counterparties list to see if it renders differently there.

Interesting! Both escaped AND unescaped 'onerror=alert' found in the DOM! Let me investigate the exact location.

Good - counterparty name is properly HTML-escaped in React. Let me now test Webhook labels and API key names, which may have different rendering.

Critical finding to investigate immediately. Navigating back to counterparties page to verify the unescaped onerror.

Confirmed: No unescaped onerror attributes - payload is safely HTML-escaped in React. Counterparty name = SAFE. Now testing Webhooks.

Webhooks page found. Let me click Create Webhook Endpoint to test form fields.

Found webhook URL field. Let me test XSS injection in the webhook URL field.

AWS WAF blocks HTML in webhook URL too. Let me test with javascript: URI and event handler bypass approaches.

Webhook API works. Now testing API key name fields.

Let me now test Payment Orders, which is a more complex form with many fields.

Let me click "Add" to expand the Additional Information section where text fields likely exist.

Found description, remittanceInformation, statementDescriptor, originatingPartyName fields. Let me inject XSS payloads.

Now let me submit via the API to test server-side filtering on payment order fields.

WAF blocks HTML. Let me try WAF bypass techniques - event handler without tags, unicode encoding.