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Track APT groups, cybercriminal organizations, and the vulnerabilities they exploit
aka: DEV-0537, Strawberry Tempest, Slippy Spider +5 more
LAPSUS$ is an extortionist threat group that became active on December 10, 2921. Unlike the majority of extortionist groups that typically rely on a combination of ransomware and data leaks, LAPSUS$ is focused on monetizing their operations exclusively through data leaks advertised on Telegram without the use of ransomware. Initially, the group focused on data breaches against Latin American and Portuguese targets but in late February 2022, LAPSUS$ began widening the scope of its targeting by announcing it had successfully breached US-based graphics and computing chip manufacturer Nvidia. Since then, LAPSUS$ has continued to focus on large-scale international technology companies, including Microsoft, Okta, and Samsung, as the financial incentive for stealing source code and extorting companies for sensitive proprietary technical data is high. Around July 2025, ShinyHunters teamed up or merged with Subgroup: Scattered Spider . They share their Telegram channel also with Lapsus$, so they may all work together now – see the DataBreaches.net references in the Information section under ShinyHunters.
aka: Gold Riverview, Spandex Tempest, CHIMBORAZO
Necurs emerged in 2012 as an infector and rootkit, and quickly partnered with elite cybercrime gangs to become part of the top spamming and infection forces in the malware realm. Unlike most botnets, Necurs stands out due to its technical complexity, partnership diversity and continued evolution in an era when even the most complex malicious infrastructures can no longer withstand disruption. In the past year alone, we have seen Necurs take on various roles. Linked with the spam distribution of the Dridex gang, it is used to spread one of the world’s most nefarious banking Trojans. It also moved to mass distributing Locky, Dridex’s ransomware child, then added distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Most recently, Necurs moved to pump-and-dump stock scam distribution before returning to spreading millions of Dridex-laden spam emails a day. Necurs has been observed to distribute Dridex ( Indrik Spider ) Locky ( Dungeon Spider ), TrickBot ( Wizard Spider, Gold Blackburn ) and much of the malware from TA505, Graceful Spider, Gold Evergreen .
aka: Gold SwathMore, GOLD SWATHMORE
Lunar Spider is reportedly associated with Wizard Spider, Gold Blackburn . ( CrowdStrike ) On March 17, 2019, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed the use of a new BokBot (developed and operated by Lunar Spider) proxy module in conjunction with TrickBot (developed and operated by Wizard Spider), which may provide Wizard Spider with additional tools to steal sensitive information and conduct fraudulent wire transfers. This activity also provides further evidence to support the existence of a flourishing relationship between these two actors. BokBot has been observed to be distributed via Emotet (operated by Mummy Spider, TA542 ) and Smoke Loader (operated by Smoky Spider). BokBot itself has been observed to distribute TrickBot ( Wizard Spider, Gold Blackburn ) and TinyLoader ( Tiny Spider ).
aka: Wine Tempest, Wadhrama
One actor that has emerged in this trend of human-operated attacks is an active, highly adaptive group that frequently drops Wadhrama as payload. Microsoft has been tracking this group for some time, but now refers to them as PARINACOTA, using our new naming designation for digital crime actors based on global volcanoes. PARINACOTA impacts three to four organizations every week and appears quite resourceful: during the 18 months that we have been monitoring it, we have observed the group change tactics to match its needs and use compromised machines for various purposes, including cryptocurrency mining, sending spam emails, or proxying for other attacks. The group’s goals and payloads have shifted over time, influenced by the type of compromised infrastructure, but in recent months, they have mostly deployed the Wadhrama ransomware. The group most often employs a smash-and-grab method, whereby they attempt to infiltrate a machine in a network and proceed with subsequent ransom in less than an hour. There are outlier campaigns in which they attempt reconnaissance and lateral movement, typically when they land on a machine and network that allows them to quickly and easily move throughout the environment.
aka: Gold Essex, Storm-0302, GOLD ESSEX +1 more
CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence has observed a new Cutwail spam campaign from NARWHAL SPIDER on 24 October 2018. NARWHAL SPIDER is the adversary name designated by Falcon Intelligence for the criminal operator of Cutwail version 2. NARWHAL SPIDER primarily provides spam services with a large customer base that has included malware operators such as Wizard Spider, Gold Blackburn (developer of TrickBot), affiliates of BAMBOO SPIDER (developer of Panda Zeus), and many others including URLZone, Nymaim and Gozi ISFB. The targets and payloads delivered through Cutwail spam campaigns are determined by the customers of NARWHAL SPIDER. Cutwail has been observed to distribute Dyre (Wizard Spider, Gold Blackburn), Zeus Panda ( Bamboo Spider, TA544 ) and much of the malware from TA505, Graceful Spider, Gold Evergreen .
aka: Mummy Spider, TA542, ATK 104 +3 more
Mummy Spider is a criminal entity linked to the core development of the malware most commonly known as Emotet or Geodo. First observed in mid-2014, this malware shared code with the Bugat (aka Feodo) banking Trojan. However, Mummy Spider swiftly developed the malware’s capabilities to include an RSA key exchange for command and control (C2) communication and a modular architecture. Mummy Spider does not follow typical criminal behavioral patterns. In particular, Mummy Spider usually conducts attacks for a few months before ceasing operations for a period of between three and 12 months, before returning with a new variant or version. After a 10 month hiatus, Mummy Spider returned Emotet to operation in December 2016 but the latest variant is not deploying a banking Trojan module with web injects, it is currently acting as a ‘loader’ delivering other malware packages. The primary modules perform reconnaissance on victim machines, drop freeware tools for credential collection from web browsers and mail clients and a spam plugin for self-propagation. The malware is also issuing commands to download and execute other malware families such as the banking Trojans Dridex and Qakbot. Mummy Spider advertised Emotet on underground forums until 2015, at which time it became private. Therefore, it is highly likely that Emotet is operated solely for use by Mummy Spider or with a small trusted group of customers. Emotet has been observed to distribute BokBot ( Lunar Spider ), Dridex ( Indrik Spider ), DoppelPaymer ( Doppel Spider ), Zeus Panda ( Bamboo Spider, TA544 ) and Trickbot ( Wizard Spider, Gold Blackburn ), as well as QakBot ( Mallard Spider ).
aka: Abraham's Ax, DEV-0500, Cobalt Sapling +6 more
In September 2021, the hacker group MosesStaff began targeting Israeli organizations, joining a wave of attacks which was started about a year ago by the Parisite, Fox Kitten, Pioneer Kitten and Agrius attack groups. Those actors operated mainly for political reasons in attempt to create noise in the media and damage the country’s image, demanding money and conducting lengthy and public negotiations with the victims. MosesStaff behaves differently. The group openly states that their motivation in attacking Israeli companies is to cause damage by leaking the stolen sensitive data and encrypting the victim’s networks, with no ransom demand. In the language of the attackers, their purpose is to “Fight against the resistance and expose the crimes of the Zionists in the occupied territories.”
aka: NetSec, ScarFace_TheOne, USDoD
During our Deepweb search in various forums, security researchers at the Lab identified a prolific TA going by the name NetSec aka ScarFace_TheOne aka Scarfac33 and targeting the U.S. infrastructure. Our research indicated that the TA has been active on the forum for over two years, taking part in various cyberattacks with diverse geographical and dynamic industry footprints. The TA’s malicious cyber activities have helped earn an aggressive reputation, besides resulting in the TA being widely endorsed and acclaimed by other notable malicious actors such as Pompompurin, Holistic-K1ller, and IPegFemBoys.
aka: Retefe Gang, Operation Emmental, Retefe Group
Surprisingly, there is a lot of media attention going on at the moment on a macOS malware called OSX/Dok. In the recent weeks, various anti-virus vendors and security researchers published blog posts on this threat, presenting their analysis and findings. While some findings where very interesting, others were misleading or simply wrong. We don’t know where the sudden media interest and the attention from anti-virus vendors on this threat actor are coming from. As a matter of fact, the threat actor behind OSX/Dok, which we call the the Retefe gang or Operation Emmental, has already been around for many years and GovCERT.ch is tracking their activities since the very beginning (2013). The purpose of this blog post is to put the puzzle pieces together and trying to bust some of the myths that have made the round in the media recently.
aka: Rocke, Iron Group, Aged Libra +2 more
This threat actor initially came to our attention in April 2018, leveraging both Western and Chinese Git repositories to deliver malware to honeypot systems vulnerable to an Apache Struts vulnerability. In late July, we became aware that the same actor was engaged in another similar campaign. Through our investigation into this new campaign, we were able to uncover more details about the actor.
aka: Scully Spider, TA547
TA547 is responsible for many other campaigns since at least November 2017. The other campaigns by the actor were often localized to countries such as Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Delivered malware included ZLoader (a.k.a. Terdot), Gootkit, Ursnif, Corebot, Panda Banker, Atmos, Mazar Bot, and Red Alert Android malware. It is worth noting that samples of DanaBot found in a public malware repository contained different campaign IDs (the “a=” parameter) than the ones we observed in the wild, suggesting that there may be activity other than that which we observed. Finally, we should mention that DanaBot bears some similarities in its technical implementation and choices of technology to earlier malware, in particular Reveton and CryptXXX [1], which were also written in Delphi and communicated using raw TCP to port 443. These malware strains also featured similarities in the style of C&C traffic. DanaBot has been observed to be distributed by Smoke Loader (operated by Smoky Spider ). DanaBot itself has been observed to distribute CoreBot ( Boson Spider ), GandCrab and Sodinokibi ( Pinchy Spider, Gold Southfield ) and TrickBot ( Wizard Spider, Gold Blackburn ).
Recently Kaspersky Lab has contributed to an alliance of law enforcement and industry organizations, to undertake measures against the internet domains and servers that form the core of an advanced cybercriminal infrastructure that uses the Shylock Trojan to attack online banking systems around the globe. Shylock is a banking Trojan that was first discovered in 2011. It utilizes man-in-the-browser attacks designed to pilfer banking login credentials from the PCs of clients of a predetermined list of target organizations. Most of these organizations are banks, located in different countries.
The pervasiveness of Salty Spider’s attacks has resulted in a long list of victims across the globe. While it seems, for the most part, that this adversary doesn’t single out particular nations and industries, there do appear to be a few pockets where SALTY SPIDER may be more prevalent. In 2017, SALTY SPIDER ceased propagation of traditional proxy and spambot payloads, and shifted its sights towards the mining and theft of cryptocurrencies. This shift is likely an indicator that the cryptocurrency industry has proven to be a more lucrative area for monetizing Sality.
aka: MAN1, Moskalvzapoe, TA511
Hancitor is an information stealer and malware downloader used by a threat actor designated as MAN1, Moskalvzapoe or TA511. In a threat brief from 2018, we noted Hancitor was relatively unsophisticated, but it would remain a threat for years to come. Approximately three years later, Hancitor remains a threat and has evolved to use tools like Cobalt Strike. In recent months, this actor began using a network ping tool to help enumerate the Active Directory (AD) environment of infected hosts. This blog illustrates how the threat actor behind Hancitor uses the network ping tool, so security professionals can better identify and block its use.
aka: The ShadowBrokers, TSB, Shadow Brokers +1 more
Breached a server where zero-days accumulated by Equation Group were held, leaked a large section on the internet and tried to sell the rest afterward. Most of the published vulnerabilities have since been fixed by the respective vendors, but many have been used by other threat actors. Most notably among the dumps were zero-days such as ETERNALBLUE that were used for the creation of infamous ransomware explosions such as WannaCry and NotPetya. Shadow Brokers turned out to be an ex-NSA contractor.
According to 360 NetLab, the (relatively) ancient malware downloader has enjoyed a slow burn on the black market, where malicious actors can pick up a customized copy for $850. While other researchers have identified various aspects of the threat, 360 NetLab took aim at the malware’s admin panel, which offers support for multiple plugins and functions — such as FORM GRAB, BOT LIST, KEYLOGGER and more — designed to help attackers successfully infiltrate targeted devices. The flexibility of Smoke Loader remains its biggest appeal; it was among the top 10 malware threats detected by Check Point in December 2018. It’s the first time a second-stage downloader has made the list, and may indicate a coming shift in the threat profiles of typical malware attacks. Smoke Loader has been observed to distribute DoppelPaymer ( Doppel Spider ), TinyLoader ( Tiny Spider ), DanaBot ( Scully Spider, TA547 ), BokBot ( Lunar Spider ), Zeus Panda ( Bamboo Spider, TA544 ) and TrickBot ( Wizard Spider, Gold Blackburn ).
aka: TA551, Gold Cabin, Shathak +5 more
TA551 (also known as Shathak) is an email-based malware distribution campaign that often targets English-speaking victims. The campaign discussed in this blog has targeted German, Italian and Japanese speakers. TA551 has historically pushed different families of information-stealing malware like Ursnif and Valak. After mid-July 2020, this campaign has exclusively pushed IcedID malware, another information stealer.
The primary threat actor, who was tracked by CrowdStrike as Zombie Spider, rose to prominence in the criminal underground under the moniker Peter Severa. The individual behind this handle is Peter Yuryevich LEVASHOV who was arrested in Spain when the final version of Kelihos was taken over in April 2017, and who recently pleaded guilty to operating the botnet for criminal purposes. For several years, pump-and-dump stock scams, dating ruses, credential phishing, money mule recruitment and rogue online pharmacy advertisements were the most common spam themes. In 2017, however, Kelihos was frequently used to spread other malware such as LuminosityLink, Zyklon HTTP, Neutrino, Nymaim, Gozi/ISFB, Panda Zeus, Kronos, and TrickBot. It was also observed spreading ransomware families including Shade, Cerber, and FileCrypt2. Kelihos has been observed to distribute TrickBot ( Wizard Spider, Gold Blackburn ) and Zeus Panda ( Bamboo Spider, TA544 ).
aka: Corsair Jackal, TunisianCyberArmy
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.
aka: Clockwork Spider
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.