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CVE-2026-55775 is a low severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 0.0. No known exploits currently, and patches are available.
Very low probability of exploitation
EPSS predicts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days based on real-world threat data, complementing CVSS severity scores with actual risk assessment.
A user that is granted namespace management (/sys/namespaces) capabilities within a non-root namespace ("the victim namespace") can abuse special handling of the literal path "root" in namespace path canonicalization to manage the victim namespace itself.
Several endpoints under /sys/namespaces/* accept a namespace path segment that is canonicalized and then appended to the path of the sys mount's containing namespace (set via path prefix or X-Vault-Namespace header) to determine the absolute path of the namespace to operate on.
Given the special namespace path "root" canonicalizes to en empty path (""), when passed as /sys/namespaces/root, the resulting absolute namespace path remains equal to the sys mount's containing namespace. Given ACLs are evaluated before namespace path canonicalization, this allows users with capabilities on /sys/namespaces/root within any given namespace to operate on the namespace itself instead.
Users that were granted the required capabilities can abuse this vulnerability to:
against the namespace containing the system backend they can manage sys/namespaces/root in. The exact range of operations that can be performed depends on the specific capabilities granted on said path and any sub-paths such as /api-lock.
Notably, the root namespace is immutable and cannot be modified, deleted or locked, and is thus unaffected. Also note that users can only abuse this vulnerability to operate on the direct parent or "containing" namespace relative to their capabilities, not arbitrary namespaces.
This will be fixed in OpenBao v2.5.5.
Start a development server:
bao server -dev
Create a namespace:
bao namespace create victim
This will be the namespace we gain unauthorized management of.
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Create a policy that allows management of namespaces, inside of the victim namespace.
bao policy write -namespace=victim namespace-management - <<EOF
path "sys/namespaces/*" {
capabilities = ["read", "update", "patch", "delete"]
}
EOF
Then create a token with above policy attached:
export BAO_TOKEN=$(bao token create -namespace=victim -policy=namespace-management -field=token)
Operate on the victim's namespace using the token, for example by outright deleting it:
bao namespace delete -namespace=victim root