CVE-2026-42223

Exposed Protected Fields

settings/node.go:

• Secret (protected) - used for cluster node authentication
• SkipInstallation (protected), Demo (protected)

settings/oidc.go (all protected):

• ClientId, ClientSecret, Endpoint, RedirectUri, Scopes, Identifier

settings/casdoor.go (all protected):

• Endpoint, ExternalUrl, ClientId, ClientSecret, CertificatePath, Organization, Application, RedirectUri

settings/auth.go:

• IPWhiteList (protected) - exposes security configuration

Attack Scenario

1. Low-privilege authenticated user calls GET /api/settings
2. Response includes NodeSecret - attacker can impersonate cluster nodes
3. Response includes OIDC ClientSecret - attacker can perform OAuth flows as the application
4. Response includes IPWhiteList - attacker learns network security configuration
5. If JwtSecret is in app settings (via cosy framework), attacker can forge authentication tokens for any user

PoC

1. GetSettings serializes all fields without filtering protected:"true" tags. From api/settings/settings.go:49-64:

c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
    "app":       cSettings.AppSettings,
    "server":    cSettings.ServerSettings,
    "database":  settings.DatabaseSettings,
    "auth":      settings.AuthSettings,
    "casdoor":   settings.CasdoorSettings,
    "oidc":      settings.OIDCSettings,
    "cert":      settings.CertSettings,
    "http":      settings.HTTPSettings,
    "logrotate": settings.LogrotateSettings,
    "nginx":     settings.NginxSettings,
    "node":      settings.NodeSettings,
    "openai":    settings.OpenAISettings,
    "terminal":  settings.TerminalSettings,
    "webauthn":  settings.WebAuthnSettings,
})

Go's json.Marshal serializes all exported fields. The custom protected:"true" tag has no effect on serialization.

2. Protected secrets are defined across settings/*.go. High-impact examples:

// settings/server_v1.go:19
JwtSecret string `json:"jwt_secret" protected:"true"`

// settings/node.go:5
Secret string `json:"secret" protected:"true"`

// settings/oidc.go
ClientSecret string `json:"client_secret" protected:"true"`

// settings/auth.go
IPWhiteList []string `json:"ip_white_list" protected:"true"`

3. ProtectedFill is write-only. It appears 10 times in SaveSettings (lines 126-135) but 0 times in GetSettings:

// api/settings/settings.go:126-135 - Only used during writes
cSettings.ProtectedFill(cSettings.AppSettings, &json.App)
cSettings.ProtectedFill(cSettings.ServerSettings, &json.Server)
cSettings.ProtectedFill(settings.AuthSettings, &json.Auth)
// ... 7 more calls

4. Exploit request. Any authenticated user can retrieve all secrets:

GET /api/settings HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer <any-valid-jwt>

Response includes (among 45 protected fields):

{
  "app": {"jwt_secret": "<the-actual-jwt-signing-key>", ...},
  "node": {"secret": "<node-authentication-secret>", ...},
  "oidc": {"client_secret": "<oidc-client-secret>", ...},
  "casdoor": {"client_secret": "<casdoor-client-secret>", ...},
  "auth": {"ip_white_list": ["10.0.0.1", ...], ...},
  "nginx": {"reload_cmd": "nginx -s reload", "restart_cmd": "...", ...}
}

Impact

• Authentication bypass via JwtSecret: An attacker who obtains the JwtSecret can forge valid JWT tokens for any user, including admin accounts. This provides permanent, independent access that survives password changes and session revocations.
• Cluster compromise via NodeSecret: The NodeSecret is used for inter-node authentication in nginx-ui clusters. An attacker can impersonate any cluster node, push malicious configurations to all nodes, and intercept cluster synchronization traffic.
• Third-party OAuth takeover: Leaked OIDC ClientSecret and Casdoor ClientSecret allow the attacker to perform OAuth flows as the nginx-ui application, potentially gaining access to user accounts on the identity provider.
• Security configuration disclosure: The IPWhiteList, ReloadCmd, RestartCmd, ConfigDir, SbinPath, and other protected fields reveal the security posture and infrastructure layout, enabling more targeted attacks.
• Low barrier to exploitation: Any authenticated user (not just admins) can access GET /api/settings. In multi-user deployments, a low-privilege operator can escalate to full admin access.

Remediation

Filter out protected:"true" fields before serialization.