CVE-2026-26205 is a low severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 0.0. No known exploits currently, and patches are available.
Very low probability of exploitation
EPSS predicts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days based on real-world threat data, complementing CVSS severity scores with actual risk assessment.
A security vulnerability has been discovered in how the input.parsed_path field is constructed. HTTP request paths are treated as full URIs when parsed; interpreting leading path segments prefixed with double slashes (//) as authority components, and therefore dropping them from the parsed path. This creates a path interpretation mismatch between authorization policies and backend servers, enabling attackers to bypass access controls by crafting requests where the authorization filter evaluates a different path than the one ultimately served.
HTTP request:
GET //admin/users HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Policy sees:
The leading //admin path segment is interpreted as an authority component, and dropped from input.parsed_path field:
{
"parsed_path": ["users"]
}
Backend receives:
//admin/users path, normalized to /admin/users.
| Request path | input.parsed_path | input.attributes.request.http.path | Discrepancy |
| - | - | - | - |
| / | [""] | / | ✅ None |
| //foo | [""] | //foo| ❌ Mismatch |
| /admin | ["admin"] | /admin | ✅ None |
| /admin/users | ["admin", "users"] | /admin/users | ✅ None |
| //admin/users | ["users"] | //admin/users | ❌ Mismatch |
Users are impacted if all the following conditions apply:
/admin/users vs /users)input.parsed_path for path-based decisionsGo: v1.13.2-envoy-2
Docker: 1.13.2-envoy-2, 1.13.2-envoy-2-static
Users who cannot immediately upgrade opa-envoy-plugin are recommended to apply one, or more, of the workarrounds described below.
merge_slashes Envoy configuration optionAs per Envoy best practices, enabling the merge_slashes configuration option in Envoy will remove redundant slashes from the request path before filtering is applied, effectively mitigating the input.parsed_path issue described in this advisory.
input.attributes.request.http.path instead of input.parsed_path in policiesThe input.attributes.request.http.path field contains the unprocessed, raw request path. Users are recommended to update any policy using input.parsed_path to instead use the input.attributes.request.http.path field.
package example
# Use instead of input.parsed_path
parsed_path := split( # tokenize into array
trim_left( # drop leading slashes
urlquery.decode(input.attributes.request.http.path), # url-decode the path
"/",
),
"/",
)
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