CVE-2026-24894 is a low severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 0.0. No known exploits currently, and patches are available.
Very low probability of exploitation
EPSS predicts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days based on real-world threat data, complementing CVSS severity scores with actual risk assessment.
When running FrankenPHP in worker mode, the $_SESSION superglobal is not correctly reset between requests. This allows a subsequent request processed by the same worker to access the $_SESSION data of the previous request (potentially belonging to a different user) before session_start() is called.
In standard PHP execution, the environment is torn down completely after every request. In FrankenPHP's worker mode, the application stays in memory, and superglobals are manually reset between requests.
The vulnerability exists because $_SESSION is stored in the Zend Engine's symbol table (EG(symbol_table)). While the standard PHP request shutdown (RSHUTDOWN) decrements the reference count of the session data, it does not remove the $_SESSION variable itself from the symbol table. FrankenPHP's reset logic (frankenphp_reset_super_globals) previously cleared other superglobals but failed to explicitly delete $_SESSION.
Consequently, until session_start() is called in the new request (which re-initializes the variable), the $_SESSION array retains the data from the previous request processed by that specific worker thread.
This is a cross-request data leakage vulnerability.
$_SESSION before calling session_start(), it can access sensitive information (authentication tokens, user IDs, PII) belonging to the previous user.$_SESSION being empty or unset to detect a "guest" state, or checks for specific keys in $_SESSION prior to session initialization, a malicious actor (or accidental race condition) could trigger privilege escalation or user impersonation.This affects only users running FrankenPHP in worker mode and not session_start() for each request, which is done by default by most frameworks.
The following steps demonstrate the issue (derived from the regression tests added in the fix):
// Request 1
session_start();
$_SESSION['secret'] = 'AliceData';
session_write_close();
$_SESSION without starting a session:// Request 2
// session_start() is NOT called
if (!empty($_SESSION)) {
echo "Leaked Data: " . $_SESSION['secret'];
}
session_start() is called immediately at the entry point of your worker script to overwrite any residual data (though this may not cover all edge cases if middleware runs before the controller).$_SESSION at the very beginning of the worker loop, before handling the request.Please cite this page when referencing data from Strobes VI. Proper attribution helps support our vulnerability intelligence research.